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Despite the growing interest in the neurobiological correlates of meditation, most research
has omitted to take into account the underlying philosophical aspects of meditation and its
wider implications.This, in turn, is reflected in issues surrounding definition, study design,
and outcomes. Here, I highlight the often ignored but important aspect of definition in the
existing scholarship on neuroscience and meditation practice. For a satisfactory account
of a neuroscience of meditation, we must aim to retrieve an operational definition that
is inclusive of a traditional ontological description as well as the modern neurocognitive
account of the phenomena. Moving beyond examining the effects of meditation practice,
to take a potential step forward in the direction to establish how meditation works, it
becomes crucial to appraise the philosophical positions that underlie the phenomenology
of meditation in the originating traditions. This endeavor may challenge our intuitions and
concepts in either directions, but issues pertaining to definition, design, and validity of
response measures are extremely important for the evolution of the field and will provide
a much-needed context and framework for meditation based interventions.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, research on neural correlates of meditation and its
efficacy in clinical settings has seen a growing trend. Meditation
training has been associated with a wide range of positive clini-
cal and behavioral health outcomes and several researchers have
identified key areas of the brain and other electrophysiological
correlates of both novice and long-term meditators. The study of
expert meditators is believed to offer a promising research strategy
for studying high-order cognitive processes.
Despite a laudable attempt to ascertain neural markers of med-
itation practice and a suggested importance in informing us about
the neural bases of consciousness (Braboszcz et al., 2010), a num-
ber of issues and shortcomings remain in this area of research. This
may be due to a variety of reasons, ranging from simply omissions,
to a lack of suitable resources to address these issues, or relative
unfamiliarity with the concept of meditation as discussed in the
traditional texts.
A wide variety of techniques termed as “meditation” and a lack
of agreement on how to best design meditation studies reflect
a poor understanding of the ontological bases of meditation.
In this context, Rao (2011) has argued that part of the prob-
lem is that meditation research is being carried out with little
or no understanding of the theoretical and cultural nuances of
meditation.
On one hand, meditation research presents an encouraging
trend for a relatively new aspect of enquiry into how the mind
works. On the other hand, accurate characterization of medi-
tation theory and practice, in particular the fundamental issues
surrounding definition, has escaped the attention of most med-
itation research published in contemporary research journals. In
the relative absence of a mature and well-developed theoretical
methodological foundation, the study of meditation owes a great
debt to the contemplative traditions. This article aims to bring
to notice the often ignored but important aspect of definition in
the existing literature on neuroscience and meditation practice. It
is critical not to generalize regarding the definition, neural cor-
relates and effects of “meditation.” This is a call for an increased
emphasis to carefully distinguish between the different techniques
and phenomenologically defined features of each procedure being
studied.
The purpose is not to discredit or call into question the neu-
roscientific findings, but to point to the import of those findings,
together with the philosophical framework of meditation practice,
in order to stimulate scientific and philosophical debate. Addition-
ally, it should be noted that the focus here is not on providing a
definition from either the traditional or the neuroscientific per-
spective. The aim, instead, is to point to the missing ontological
grounding from which arise the issues surrounding definition and
design that plague this area of research. To illustrate this point, I
will briefly explore some reports that discuss the neural markers
of meditation practice and highlight some mixed findings from
these reports. I further argue that the issue of definition needs
to be adequately addressed, failing which, several conflicts in the
philosophical context of meditation practice vis-à-vis the neuro-
scientific search for the neural basis of meditation are likely to
pile up.
DEFINITION ISSUES
A key concern in neuroscientific investigations of meditation
processes is the lack of an operational definition. Can medita-
tion be defined in scientific terms and if yes, why has it been
neglected for so long? Additionally, if such an attempt is to be
www.frontiersin.org January 2013 | Volume 3 | Article 613 | 1
Awasthi Definition issues in meditation research
made, should the traditional definitions be ignored or reconciled
with the modern neuroscientific understanding of mind and men-
tal states? When the neuroscientific studies report their findings,
are the studies reporting processes that are the epiphenomena
of the meditation state or the actual neurophysical instantiation
of the meditation practice? Are there several levels or states of
meditation or is there just one state that is measured by elec-
trophysiology, behavioral, and neuroimaging methods? Further, if
there are several levels and/or states of meditation, do they all have
similar or different instantiations or associated mechanisms in the
brain? These are some of the questions that meditation research,
presently, seems to have neglected.
Many reviewers and researchers practically assume that all
processes labeled meditation are similar – an assumption which
is flawed. At times, no distinctions are made between the various
techniques and the different stages in the progress of meditation in
the studies conducted. Without evaluating the differential effects
of such techniques, a comparison of results from such compar-
ative studies may not offer much in terms of characterizing the
outcomes and alleged benefits (Rao and Paranjpe, 2008). At the
same time, it is assumed that researchers and readers are well-
versed with the state of meditation. Unlike the alert and wakeful
state, meditation requires specific training. It is, therefore, difficult
to separate the meditation state from the training that produces it
(Tang et al., 2012).
In the modern context, meditation has been defined in a
variety of ways, including attentional training to mindfulness
(Kabat-Zinn, 2003) and relaxation-based methods (Benson et al.,
1974) to automatic self-transcending (Travis and Shear, 2010).
Some research suggests that different forms and practices can be
seen as variations of concrete operationalizations of meditation
(Bærentsen et al., 2010). A section of research studies continue
to label a wide variety of mental training techniques as med-
itation, including, for example, imagery of the Buddhist deity
(Kozhevnikov et al., 2009), Hatha Yoga, Omkar meditation (Har-
inath et al., 2004), mantra meditation, Yoga, Tai Chi, Qi Gong
(Ospina et al., 2008), brain-wave vibration meditation (Jang et al.,
2011), and Kirtan Kriya (KK) meditation (sound repetition with
finger-thumb touching; Moss et al., 2012). Others, like Baijal
and Srinivasan (2010), studied a concentrative form called Sahaj
Samadhi meditation, while Vago and Nakamura (2011) studied the
Mindfulness-based Meditation Training (MMT) program involv-
ing a combination of concentrative and open monitoring (OM)
types of meditation, breath and body awareness, light stretching,
and relaxation exercises.
Ospina et al. (2007) meta-analyzed a large sample of stud-
ies within five broad categories of meditation practices (mantra
meditation, mindfulness meditation, Yoga, Tai Chi, and Qi Gong ).
Reporting poor methodological quality in the studies examined,
they suggested that positive therapeutic effects and well-being may
not be specific to the meditation practices and can be achieved
by somatic relaxation training and prayer. In contrast, Hofmann
et al. (2010) argued for specific support of mindfulness-based
therapy for treating anxiety and depression. In another recent
study, Luders et al. (2012) showed evidence for thicker corpora
callosa in meditators compared to controls. The meditators in
this study (age range: 24–64 years) had been practicing from 5
to 46 years and were recruited from Chenrezig, Kriya, Shamatha,
Vajrayana, Vipassana, and Zazen traditions. While Luders et al.
(2012) argued that the inclusion of various meditation styles
allows for an investigation of the neural correlates of common
and overlapping elements of meditation, detailed phenomeno-
logical as well as neuro-behavioral accounts of the various styles
remains to be seen in the literature.
MEDITATION AS RELAXATION
In the early days of research on meditation, relaxation was the key
conceptual factor. Relaxation response was proposed as a physi-
ological state opposite to that of stress, aiming to modify mental
activity, and reduce arousal as a kind of therapeutic intervention.
In contrast to attention training or (Benson’s) relaxation response,
some traditional texts describe meditation as the elimination of
thought activity (Rukmani, 2001), i.e., mental silence that is ori-
entated toward a specific/altered state of consciousness. Without
reducing alertness, the practice aims to eliminate mental activity
altogether as part of an overarching strategy to facilitate the devel-
opment of consciousness. The “relaxation” conceptualization of
meditation thus completely ignores the concept of mental silence
or “trans-thought awareness” (Krishnamurti, 1975, p. 216; Osho,
1996).
MEDITATION AS ATTENTION
While early studies ascribed the practices of relaxation and focus-
ing attention to meditation, a few recent attempts have been made
to delineate the specific psychological processes implicated in these
two practices and to derive neurofunctional predictions. Within
the attentional paradigm, Dunn et al. (1999) and Lutz et al. (2008)
have proposed two broad categories: focused attention (FA) and
OM type of meditation. These, according to the authors, are based
on traditional meditation texts and modern neuroscientific con-
ceptions. However, it is likely that different traditional texts may
word the description differently depending on context, language,
and available translations. Further, Travis and Shear (2010) have
argued for self-transcending, whereas Rao (2011) suggests passive
diffused attention or “inattention” as the defining feature of medi-
tation. Recently, Mikulas (2011) has reported that mindfulness and
concentration practices are often confused in the literature. There-
fore, a theoretical framework is needed to produce an operational
definition for meditative practices that can be adopted in the sci-
entific study of effects of meditation training on the brain. While
the FA versus OM distinction represents a considerable advance
over assumptions of equivalence, and may be a productive dis-
tinction in some contexts, it represents only an initial stage of
stimulus description and analysis. For instance, Bærentsen et al.
(2010) quote a classic text to describe meditation:
“meditation is defined as the control of fluctuations of the mind
that aim to still the fluctuations (patterning) of the mind. When
the fluctuations of the mind are controlled, the yogi achieves
concentration, i.e., meditation (samadhi or Nirvana).” (p. 58,
italics in original)
The authors (p. 58, italics in original) then continue to describe
meditation “in contrast to a ‘normal,’ uncontrolled state of mind
in which, according to Patanjali, the self (the mind, awareness)
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identifies itself with the fluctuating patterns of consciousness.” Here,
it should be noted that concentration and meditation are used
interchangeably and several different concepts and terminologies
like samadhi, nirvana, and fluctuations of consciousness are being
introduced. This ambiguity in defining the task at hand proba-
bly also stems from a reliance on unverified translations of the
original classical texts with no comparable concept available in
neuroscience. Some of these issues, as Rao (2011) notes, can be
attributed to borrowed concepts and tools lacking in relevant
conceptual clarity and methodological sophistication.
Patanjala-Yoga-Sutra (PYS), a seminal text, describes concen-
trative focus as “dharana” and effortless awareness “dhyana” as
distinct states. Other texts also differentiate between the focused
attentional training (dharana), and the meditative state of dhyana
(GoraksaSatakam: Kuvalayananda and Shukla, 2006; Gheranda
Samhita: Digambarji and Gharote, 1997). In a scholarly com-
mentary on the PYS, Karambelkar (2006) reported several stages
of concentrative focus or dharana. Dhyana or meditation is
described as a very precise state that goes beyond (transcends)
the focused one-pointedness. It is also mentioned that the former
dharana (concentration), the middle dhyana (meditation), and
final samadhi (absorption) are consecutive stages and that the ear-
lier ones transform and culminate into the next. Thus, it should be
clear that the technique (imagery, chanting, or breath watching),
states produced (concentration, attentive, OM, or mindfulness),
and the mechanical dynamics (fluctuations of mind) underlying
different types of experiences need to be distinguished. One should
bear in mind that the list of techniques and states discussed here
is not exhaustive. With an exclusive focus on assessing cognitive
capacities of attention and awareness, investigation of meditation
and its effects shall remain confined to particular domains.
MEDITATION AS MINDFULNESS
More recently, mindfulness has been proposed as a cognitive
behavioral, rather than physiological, paradigm for meditation.
Mindfulness aims to develop enhanced awareness of the moment-
to-moment experience of perceptible mental processes. It involves
“training practitioners to attend to a wide range of chang-
ing objects of attention while maintaining moment-to-moment
awareness (mindfulness), rather than restricting one’s focus to a
single object such as a mantra” (Kabat-Zinn, 2003, p. 145). Several
mindfulness-based interventions, such as the Mindfulness-Based
Stress Reduction (MBSR: an 8-week program with 3 h of weekly
group sessions and daily homework), have since been developed
for clinical and empirical research on the topic. Mindfulness and
concentration are not necessarily contrasted as distinct practices
(in some Buddhist cases concentration meditation requires mind-
fulness) and diverse perspectives on the meanings and origins of
mindfulness have been offered by various researchers (Williams
and Kabat-Zinn, 2011).
Grossman (2008, 2011), Van Dam et al. (2009), and Grossman
and Van Dam (2011) have called into question whether self-report
measures of mindfulness [Mindful Attention Awareness Scale
(MAAS) and Mindful Attention Awareness Scale – Adolescent
(MAAS–A)] actually assess mindfulness. There are many differ-
ent scales that purport to measure mindfulness and the results
obtained reflect more about the scales, rather than mindfulness
itself (Van Dam et al., 2011). Assessing constructs in a culture
different from where it originated is likely to have limitations.
In the relative absence of external referents to verify the validity
of constructs of mindfulness use in self-report scales, much of
the research findings based on these indirect assessments remain
limited in its validity. In the traditional context, mindfulness is
derived from the Pali word “sati” that conveys the meaning-to
remember (remember to maintain awareness) with four distinct
phases described in the traditional literature. This is clearly distinct
from the modern attempts at operationalizing a fixed trait-like
definition of mindfulness that ignores the developmental and
contextual aspects (Grossman and Van Dam, 2011). Individuals
with no meditation experience respond to the word “mindfulness”
questionnaire items differently from people with meditation expe-
rience, as seems likely from the results of a study (using the MAAS),
where binge-drinking college students scored significantly higher
scores compared to experienced meditators (Leigh et al., 2005).
It was further queried if the construct of mindfulness can
be understood apart from mindfulness training, and whether
there is empirical evidence to support the validity of mindful-
ness measures. More such issues regarding reliability and validity
of self-report questionnaires have been raised recently (Bergomi
et al., 2012; also see Brown et al., 2011). In assessing all the
available self-report scales of mindfulness, Bergomi et al. (2012)
report that these scales do not offer a comprehensive assessment
of all aspects of mindfulness in samples from the general pop-
ulation. Similarly, Chiesa (2012) stated that modern attempts
to operationalize mindfulness have consistently failed to pro-
vide an unequivocal definition of mindfulness that takes into
account the complexity of the original traditional definitions of
mindfulness. According to Grossman (2011), currently used self-
report measures of mindfulness may instead reduce and distort
the meaning of mindful awareness in psychological sciences that
could negatively impact the possibility of further development of
mindfulness-based interventions.
MIXED FINDINGS
A growing body of research has investigated the effects of medi-
tation practice on the resting or “default” state, with a wide range
of findings reported. Default-mode network (DMN) includes the
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC),
and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), with all these regions active
in the resting state. Some studies have reported enhanced func-
tional connectivity and/or resting state activity in the frontal cor-
tices associated with several different meditation practices (Mind-
fulness meditation: Berkovich-Ohana et al., 2012; Zen meditation:
Faber et al., 2008; Brain-wave vibration meditation: Jang et al.,
2011; Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction: Kilpatrick et al., 2011).
Cortical areas associated with the DMN are substantially similar to
those associated with mind wandering (Gusnard et al., 2001; Kel-
ley et al., 2002; Buckner et al., 2008) and thus have been implicated
in meditation practice.
Jang et al. (2011) studied the effects of “brain-wave vibration
meditation” (a kind of moving meditation to quieten the think-
ing mind and release negative emotions by performing natural
rhythmic movements and focusing on bodily sensations) and
report increased greater functional connectivity within the DMN
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in the mPFC area compared to controls. In contrast, in an fMRI
study exploring functional connectivity in Zen meditators, Taylor
et al. (2012) report weaker functional connectivity between DMN
regions in meditators compared with controls. In another fMRI
functional connectivity study by Kilpatrick et al. (2011), compared
to controls, subjects with 8 weeks of MBSR training showed signif-
icant functional connectivity differences in auditory and medial
visual networks. In a study with three meditation types – con-
centration, loving-kindness, choiceless awareness, Brewer et al.
(2011), found that the main nodes of the DMN (medial prefrontal
and posterior cingulate cortices) were relatively deactivated across
the three meditation types studied. In a more recent fMRI study
involving functional connectivity analyses, Froeliger et al. (2012)
report that mindfulness meditation practitioners exhibit signifi-
cantly greater resting state functional connectivity in DMN than
control subjects. In contrast, in an EEG study by Berkovich-Ohana
et al. (2012), mindfulness meditators exhibited lower DMN activ-
ity compared to controls. The conflicting results in these studies
could be due to varied reasons like different techniques studied or
subjects tested in different stages of meditation.
Thus, it is obvious that different kinds of meditation techniques
show different functional connectivity patterns in the DMN. Given
the variety of techniques clubbed together as meditation, these
findings are difficult to interpret and remain puzzling in the con-
text of a lack of consensus on the definition of meditation/a
particular meditation. One of the reasons that researchers get dif-
ferent results is because they are studying different procedures.
Different techniques of meditation employing a wide variety of
methods like mental imagery, chanting, concentration training,
OM, or breath counting etc., are expected to exhibit different
patterns of functional connectivity.
STUDY DESIGN ISSUES
For an objective examination of the correlates of any stimulus or
mental task or phenomena on behavioral or neurological changes,
the characteristics of the stimulus in question have to be tightly
controlled and characterized with utmost precision. The matter of
the sensitivity, appropriateness, reliability, and validity of response
measures is extremely important for the evolution of any research
field, and especially for meditation research. Incorporating the
ontological definition of meditation will provide a much-needed
context and framework for the interventions borrowed from or
based on meditation. The lack of an operationalized definition
further leads to several study design issues.
A significant number of studies on meditation that aim to
explore its neural concomitants have largely employed protocols
that ignore comparisons with the non-meditator control partic-
ipants (Wallace, 1970; Hebert and Lehmann, 1977; Aftanas and
Golocheikine, 2001; Arambula et al., 2001). Some studies have
compared meditators with non-meditators during rest (Travis
et al., 2002; Davidson et al., 2003). Trait effects occur due to
a long-term practice of meditation resulting in baseline differ-
ences between meditators and non-meditator controls (Cahn and
Polich, 2006). Results from studies (Deepak et al., 1994; Khare
and Nigam, 2000; Aftanas and Golocheikine, 2001; Travis et al.,
2002) that have compared neural activity during meditation with
the resting state of meditators may be confounded by the trait
changes in meditators. The studies that compare oscillatory activ-
ity between meditators (during meditation) and non-meditators
(during relaxation; Banquet, 1973; Lehmann et al., 2001; Travis
et al., 2002; Davidson et al., 2003) have also ignored the tracking
of state changes that occur with meditation practice. Travis (2011)
explored if psychological well-being and mindfulness are related
to the type of meditation technique practiced and argued that it
was difficult to interpret findings between different groups due to
large demographic and process differences.
Through a meta-analysis, Sedlmeier et al. (2012) provided a
comprehensive overview of the effects of meditation on psycho-
logical variables in non-clinical groups of adult meditators. The
authors identified several methodological problems in a large
number of studies and reported a lack of sufficient theoretical
background in most studies. They examined 21 separate categories
of dependent measures in a large number of meditation research
reports and reported that overall, meditation does not exert uni-
form effects on the categories of dependent measures examined.
The authors compared meditation with relaxation response and
cognitive training and reported that meditation is not just a
relaxation technique. Instead, they found that meditation has a
substantial impact on psychological variables, and these effects are
stronger for emotional than for cognitive variables.
TECHNIQUE VERSUS STATE
Many researchers also seem to confuse the technique of medi-
tation with the state of meditation. A large variety of research
variously describes several techniques and calls them different
meditations. The traditional texts describe a multitude of tech-
niques, with anthologies discussing eligibility and suitability for
enthusiasts and students, outlining the different types, tastes, and
expertise levels. For instance, just one text, Vigyan Bhairav Tantra
describes over a hundred different meditation methods that range
from silent sitting, breath observation, and mental imagery to vig-
orous chaotic breathing, intense activity, and sexual excitation. If
meditation is a mental state, precise characteristics of the state
need to be identified. Holding an image of some deity, flowing
compassion toward the whole of humanity, or concentration are
mental activities, or mental states. The issue then is, how are these
mental states different from any other mental states, such as doing
arithmetic, or remembering past events? Is meditation a different
(unique) kind of mental state? Or is it a stance – of non-judgment,
watchfulness, and non-identification toward any and all thought
activity? If there are techniques involved in attaining or leading up
to the states of meditation, all the steps involved in the process need
to be outlined. Different techniques employed in different med-
itative practices will have different neurophysiological correlates.
The failure to delineate meditation techniques from the meditative
state thus confounds research findings.
Despite the fact that previous research has proposed a distinc-
tion in trait versus state measurement of meditation effects, a
sizable number of current studies treat mindfulness as a trait-
like quality. Contending that trait versus state classification of
mindfulness is not mutually exclusive, Chiesa (2012) argues that
mindfulness can also be considered a state that is maintained when
attention to experience is intentionally cultivated (also see Thomp-
son and Waltz, 2007). In such a scenario, it becomes pertinent to
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examine how mindfulness is conceptualized in a particular study
and the psychological variables used to measure the efficacy.
It is often overlooked that most meditation techniques in the
originating disciplines were not promulgated as stress reduc-
tion methods alone. In many traditional contexts, a wide variety
of preparatory measures and practices were considered essen-
tial before being introduced to meditation techniques. There are
many techniques, involving body postures and activities, mental
imagery to sounds, and chanting accompanied by fragrant and
calm environs, that may facilitate certain brain changes.
The preparatory methods comprised several stages within dis-
ciplines like Yoga (consisting of many steps, including moral
and psychological training, posture practice, breath modula-
tion, diet, and behavioral recommendations, among others)
as described in PYS (Karambelkar, 2006), Hathapradipika of
Swatmarama (Digambaraji and Kokaje, 1998), GoraksaSatakam
(Kuvalayananda and Shukla, 2006), Gheranda Samhita (Digam-
barji and Gharote, 1997), and Shiv Samhita (Maheshanandji et al.,
1999). These preliminary practices were followed by relaxation
techniques, mediated through the autonomic nervous system,
which then prepared a subject for introduction to meditation tech-
niques. While the techniques by themselves are quite varied and
aim to bring about an attentive state of OM of physiological and
mental events without judgment, it bears repeating that the tech-
niques themselves are different from the state. In such a scenario,
it may be pertinent to tease apart the relaxation changes brought
about by techniques and the neuro-behavioral changes associated
with the state of meditation itself, and studies should clearly iden-
tify them as such. The failure to distinguish between the state
versus the technique of meditation contributes to the confusion in
the field (Rao, 2011).
ONE SIZE FITS ALL?
Meditation is commonly promoted as a way to reduce stress,
bring about relaxation, and even manage mental health issues
like depression. There are widespread courses conducted for class-
rooms, prisons, and hospitals with the underlying belief and
assumption that it is good and safe for everyone and that most
people are ready for it. While a majority of meditation teachers
with varied techniques, prescribe meditation for a wide variety of
psycho-spiritual ailments, it remains to be seen if the techniques on
their own bring about expected results. While basic techniques like
watching the breath may not be complicated for many, others that
include vigorous activity, sound based, or mental imagery, might
not be equally risk-free. A number of studies have documented
negative side-effects induced by meditation and relaxation-based
methods (Transcendental meditation on blood pressure: Canter
and Ernst, 2004; Relaxation-associated panic attacks: Cohen et al.,
1985; Relaxation-induced anxiety : Heide and Borkovec,1983,1984;
depersonalization syndrome: Kennedy, 1976; Relaxation-induced
panic attacks: Lazarus and Mayne, 1990; Spiritual practices and
DSM-IV : Lukoff, 1998; Adverse effects in long-term meditators:
Shapiro, 1992). Thus, in addition to finding an appropriate tech-
nique, safety, and efficacy also remain important starting points
before meditation is publicized as a panacea for restoring men-
tal health and well-being. It would be worthwhile to point out
that in the modern setting, while meditation is being proposed
(and taught in clinical settings) to bring about physical well-being,
mental health, and to enhance cognitive and other skills; in the
traditional context, however, physical and mental well-being are
pre-requisites to begin meditation practice.
Recently, in a meta-analysis, Eberth and Sedlmeier (2012)
reported large differences in the effect sizes reported for MBSR ver-
sus mindfulness meditation. The authors argued that the reported
effects of MBSR over mindfulness might be due to additional fac-
tors such as psychoeducation, participants’ expectations, as well
as methodological variations in the studies comparing MBSR
and mindfulness. Other reasons include a focus on psychological
health rather than higher mental states, and differences between
the participant groups (people attending MBSR courses for stress
reduction might differ from people visiting a meditation center to
attain wisdom or higher mental states).
Another aspect of meditation research involves measuring the
quantity or dosage of meditation. Various studies report that
meditation-related benefits are associated with the amount of
practice a person has undertaken (with the aim that repeated
sustained practice leads to beneficial effects; Concentration medi-
tation: Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007; compassion meditation: Pace
et al., 2009; any meditative tradition (unspecified): Baron Short
et al., 2010; FA, and OM : Manna et al., 2010). A number of studies
report the total number of years, while others detail the total hours
(usually in thousands) that a meditator has engaged in meditation.
Comparing meditators (from FA and OM styles) with controls,
Chan and Woollacott (2007) report that the amount of time spent
meditating each day is a stronger predictor of attention perfor-
mance, compared to the greater number of hours of meditative
practice over a lifetime. Hasenkamp and Barsalou (2012) went
a step further and reported the total lifetime hours (number of
years× days×minutes each day, including retreats) of FA medita-
tion experience. This quantification, though useful, assumes that
meditation is a single state wherein the duration of time spent
practicing amounts to meditation experience. Such quantification
ignores the concept of depth of meditation as well as the possible
levels of depth involved in the experience.
In a study of sustained attention-based meditation,
Brefczynski-Lewis et al. (2007) reported that compared to novices,
expert meditators showed higher brain activation with 19,000 h
of practice, while with 44,000 h, they showed lesser activation.
Recently, there have been some reports on the efficacy of short-
term meditation on brain function (Tang et al., 2007, 2010; Barn-
hofer et al., 2010; Moyer et al., 2011). A number of traditional
meditation practices are known to have demanded dedicated
effort and time for several years to obtain and maintain a steady,
detached, witnessing state of mental functioning (Thera, 1973;
Gunaratana, 2002). It still needs to be established how the expec-
tations of immediate and quick results collate with the long-term
commitment for dedicated, continued practice in the traditional
context. This would enable some guidelines regarding an effica-
cious dosage for therapeutic purposes in clinical settings. As of
now, no unique behaviors and neurophysiological patterns have
been documented to be specific to meditation, making it difficult
to gage the extent to which meditation practice changes behavioral
or neural structure. Rao (2011) has argued that current medita-
tion research focusing solely on (short) term practice and efficacy
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of meditation for health benefits may be mistaking the chaff for
the wheat.
Forsaking the important issue of defining the terms properly
in a neuroscientific context, several studies cite from non-peer-
reviewed publications and offer translations of texts from religious
or spiritual traditions. Researchers have quoted from traditional
texts mentioning that meditation is “to still the fluctuations of
the mind” (Bærentsen et al., 2010), but ignore situating the neu-
roscience findings in a philosophical premise and in the larger
context of the mind-body problem. Meditation research findings
have not been discussed in the larger philosophical contexts of
how and where the fit is, vis-a-vis the current notions of brain-
mind identity or supervenience theory that forms the bedrock of
cognitive neuroscience today (Damasio, 1994; Feldman Barrett,
2009). Instead of ignoring the philosophy, it is essential to revisit
the underlying ontological positions from the philosophical doc-
trines of meditation practice. It is important to note that there is no
implication that the investigation of neural correlates implies any
specific stand on the mind-body problem, nor that any particular
stance would be useful.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
A large and growing body of work is being carried out that
aims to provide a framework of functional and structural brain
activity associated with meditation practice. A wide variety of
techniques and methods are collectively termed as “meditation”
with mixed and at times contradictory findings reported within
the neuroscientific literature. It seems that more than a confu-
sion of labels, there is the lack of a theoretical foundation – a
philosophical grounding – for the neuroscience of meditation
to develop firm roots in order to flourish and bear fruit. While
most meditation research has explored the psychological and neu-
roscientific perspective, little work has been carried out at the
philosophico-literary level.
As outlined in this article, the lack of understanding reflected in
the definition issue impacts research design in this area, and con-
tributes to other problems such as a scarcity of replication studies.
This further exacerbates into a failure to address important ques-
tions like: how does meditation bring about changes at the neural,
cognitive, and behavioral level? Prior to drawing any causal infer-
ence, Moonesinghe et al. (2007) have emphasized a vital need for
replication studies and have re-iterated such an exercise to be the
cornerstone of science. So far, there have been sparse attempts
to consolidate research findings from a conceptual, psychological,
and neural perspective. In a review, combining concepts like atten-
tion and emotional regulation, body and self-awareness, Holzel
et al. (2011) explored a theoretical framework through which
mindfulness meditation exerts its effects. This review, however,
does not account for or include the philosophical underpinnings
of meditation practice, neither in the neuroscientific context, nor
in the traditional ontology.
In a study, Bærentsen et al. (2010) reported:
“the classical texts on meditation are in fine agreement with
modern systems theoretical approaches to understanding brain
processes and consciousness. Such theories regard conscious-
ness and higher mental processes as a result of integrated
activities in local areas of the brain, each contributing spe-
cific functions to the global activity pattern.” (p. 59, italics in
original)
It should be noted, however, that the mind-body ontology in clas-
sical Yoga texts is dualist and is not in agreement with modern
approaches that equate consciousness and mind as a result of brain
activity. The foundational principles of Yoga are based on Samkhya
philosophy which is explicitly dualist (i.e., consciousness and mat-
ter are ontologically separate entities; Sen Gupta, 1986). In fact,
the whole effort of Yoga and meditation practice is to get rid of the
“illusion” of mind-body identification achieved through moral,
physical, and mental training (Dasgupta, 1924; Rao, 2011).
Various meditative practices are reported to induce a wide
variety of altered states of consciousness. It is thus frequently
claimed that the study of meditation will contribute to our gen-
eral understanding of the neural basis of consciousness. However,
how the phenomenology of meditation relates to the prevalent
information-processing concept of the mind still remains an area
open for examination and debate. Beyond developing a theory of
physical embodiment, seeking causal explanations within a neural
implementation might be at odds with the dualist framework of
several foundational contemplative traditions. In the context of
meditation research, before proceeding further with more empir-
ical investigations, it is nonetheless essential to examine the philo-
sophical context in which the meditation practices originate. In
the absence of conceptual tools, theoretical models and the under-
lying ontological basis, the field may not progress beyond finding
some psychological and neural correlates. With no clear external
referents, or gold-standard measures with which to verify various
meditative practices, there is a need for conceptual rigor in devel-
oping theoretical models consistent with the traditional ontology
and to develop testable hypotheses in accordance with cognitive
neuroscience methods. Ioannidis (2005, p. 698) has asserted that
“greater the flexibility in designs, definitions, outcomes, and ana-
lytical modes in a scientific field, the less likely the research findings
are to be true.”
POSSIBLE FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Currently, a large variety of heterogeneous groups of practices
focusing on attentional, mindfulness, relaxational, imagery-based
interventions are currently subsumed under the same label “med-
itation.” As a possible step toward redressing this issue in the
literature, paying due attention to the contextual and historical
origins of meditation traditions is vital, if the definitions are to be
understood (and translated) correctly. Instead of ignoring the first-
person methodologies from traditional psychology, it might serve
better, the cause of developing a comprehensive science of medi-
tation, to integrate them with the third-person methodologies of
neuroscience.
Sedlmeier et al. (2012) argue that the current state of theories
on meditation does not allow us to derive very specific hypothe-
ses, at least not for most of the dependent measures that have
been studied in meditation research so far. In the absence of
proper theoretical grounding, alternative explanations seem to
overshadow the veracity and reliability of the results. Since, the
dependent measures examined in the vast majority of studies still
lack precision (see Sedlmeier et al., 2012), it is useful to explore the
Frontiers in Psychology | Consciousness Research January 2013 | Volume 3 | Article 613 | 6
Awasthi Definition issues in meditation research
respective effects while being mindful of differences in the various
techniques being studied. In the pursuit of measuring psycho-
physical correlates of meditation, the psychological, physiological,
and behavioral measures currently employed by researchers may
not be specific to the particular meditation sub-type.
An in-depth study within the philosophico-literary aspects of
meditation can help propose testable hypotheses within the scien-
tific domain. Different stages of meditation have been extensively
discussed in the traditional texts and post philosophico-literary
deliberation, these could be useful to develop testable hypothesis
within the neuroscientific domain. Comparative studies explor-
ing differences between various approaches and practitioners from
various traditions might serve to provide useful pilot data to delin-
eate neurophysiological differences across the spectrum. Further,
in agreement with suggestions by Sedlmeier et al. (2012), identifi-
cation and isolation of the components of attention within various
meditation methods, deriving predictions from different combi-
nations of these components and investigating their impact by
suitable measures could be a promising start.
Chiesa (2012) has re-iterated the overlap between the concept
of mindfulness and related concepts of equanimity, ethics, wis-
dom, compassion etc. Further, exploration of context-effects, non-
attentional components (such as sensory deprivation or enhance-
ment methods, chaotic versus relaxed breathing) and moral disci-
plines could be very useful. Since, there are likely to be several stages
involved in meditation sub-types, findings from single case studies
as well as group comparisons might add valuable contributions to
the field.
Neuroscience to-date has focused mainly on the third-person,
neuro-behavioral side of the explanatory gap within the mind-
body problem. By not giving sufficient attention to the ways in
which meditation has been interpreted, developed, and expounded
in the original sources, meditation researchers neglect and mis-
understand important aspects of the method. A fruitful avenue
of research might be to investigate aspects of meditation using
a definition that could possibly do justice to both contemplative
traditions and modern cognitive neuroscience. Here, the challenge
for a comprehensive account of meditation may not be to show
that the inferences from one or the other tradition are false, but
rather how the perspectives adopted by these traditions might offer
useful, complementary insights into the nature of the phenomena
of mental training.
Attempts to include the phenomenological account of medita-
tion will help ascertain and formulate a clear and operational def-
inition for making progress. In agreement with Lutz and Thomp-
son (2003), it might be useful to adopt a neurophenomenological
approach that can be used to guide the study of physiological
processes. An integration of traditional ontology, first-person phe-
nomenological reports and neuroscientific findings will enable
the development of more comprehensive models of the mind to
help find common grounds for scientific research with the con-
templative traditions. It will foster better study designs, leading
to conclusive findings that could potentially be developed into
systematic therapeutic interventions, besides fostering an inter-
esting and important avenue of research into the mind-body
problem.
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